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CASE COMMENTS
gations. 34 Congress should not be unnecessarily hampered in its search
for facts, but neither should it forget its responsibility as a guardian of
individual liberties.3 5
This decision points a way to limit abuses of Congress' investigatory power without unduly hindering it by technical procedural devices. If a hearing is solely for fact gathering purposes no harm may
result if it is televised. If criminal prosecutions appear to be a byproduct of the hearing, however, it would behoove Congress to recognize its responsibility,"8 forbid the televising of such hearings, protect
our criminal procedural safeguards, and foster our burgeoning right
3
to privacy. 7
PARIS G.

SINGER

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FREEDOM OF ATTENTION ON
COMMON CARRIERS
Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952)
In response to protests concerning the use of radios in vehicles
operated by Capital Transit Company, the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia found after investigation that the
transit radio programs were "not inconsistent with public convenience,
comfort and safety."', Pollak and others, as persons "affected," 2 appealed to the district court from the commission's final order on
597, 602 (N.D. Ohio 1952) (power of inquiry must be exercised with due regard for
the rights of witnesses).
34U.S. CONSr. Art. I, §1; Art. 11, §1; Art. III, §1.
35Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270

(1904).
-oCongress' power of investigation and the manner of its use

"...

will largely

determine the position and prestige of the Congress in the future." President
(then Senator) Truman, when retiring from the "Truman" Committee, 90 CONG.
REC. 6747 (1944).
37Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harrv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
'Re Capital Transit Co., 81 P.U.R. (N.s.) 122, 126 (1949).
2Seeking review pursuant to 49 STAT. 882-885 (1935), D.C. CODE §§43-705 to 43710 (1940).
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grounds of: (1) encroachment upon liberty and deprivation of property under the Fifth Amendment, and (2) interference with the
freedom not to listen implicit in the First Amendment. The district
court held that no legal right had been violated; the court of appeals
reversed as a matter of law on the sole ground that forced listening
deprives a captive audience of liberty in violation of the Fifth Amendment.3 On certiorari, HELD, transit radio programs consisting of music,
short commercials, and announcements do not violate the First or
4
Fifth Amendments. Judgment reversed, Justice Douglas dissenting.
Analysis of the import of the instant decision requires careful
summarization of those facts that particularly impressed the Supreme
Court. The broadcasting equipment consisted of a receiving set and
six loud-speakers per vehicle, all tuned to a single station. Volume
of sound was adjusted so as not to interfere with either ordinary conversation or signals and announcements incident to vehicle operation. 5
The commission found as a fact that the broadcasting had caused
neither accidents nor inefficient operation of buses. 6 The programs
comprised ninety percent music, five percent news, weather reports,
and matters of civic interest, and five percent commercial advertising
in the form of statements lasting from fifteen to thirty seconds each
and averaging approximately three minutes per hour. 7 A carefully
conducted opinion survey by a disinterested organization employed
for the task showed that only three percent of the passengers in
those buses equipped with radios were firmly opposed to the broadcasting and that over three fourths of them positively favored it.8
sPollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951). See Note, 5 U.
or FLA. L. REv. 92, 95 (1952), for a thorough analysis of the proceedings up to
the granting of certiorari on Oct. 15, 1951.
4Frankfurter, J., did not participate because, as he states at p. 467, he was "a
victim of the practice in controversy."
5At p. 455, n.2.
6At p. 458; cf. the finding at Re Capital Transit Co., 81 P.U.R. (N.s.) 122, 126
(1949), based on ample evidence appearing at 124.
7At pp. 460-461.
sAt pp. 459-460, quoting the commission's report as follows: "Of those interviewed, 93A per cent were not opposed; that is, 76.3 were in favor, 13.9 said they
didn't care, and 3.2 said they didn't know; 6.6 per cent were not in favor, but when
asked the question 'Well, even though you don't care for such programs personally,
would you object if the majority of passengers wanted busses and streetcars equipped
with radio receivers,' 3.6 said they would not object or oppose the majority will.
Thus, a balance of 3 per cent of those interviewed were firmly opposed to the
use of radios in transit vehicles."
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Only one small interurban line competes with Capital Transit Company, but the latter's service is subject to regulation by the District
Public Service Commission.
Whether to include the right to freedom of attention in the word
"liberty" as regards a passenger on the only common carrier readily
available to him is a constitutional problem never before squarely
presented to the judiciary. The common law conception of liberty
envisioned freedom from physical restraint only. 9 As early as 1890
Brandeis and Warren suggested constitutional protection of the right
to privacy;10 but not until 1897 did the Supreme Court declare that
liberty under the Constitution ".... means not only the right of the
citizen to be free from the mere physical restraint of his person, as
by incarceration," but also includes the right "to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties ... ."I' In Kovacs v. Cooper 2 the Court
upheld the validity of a city ordinance barring from the public streets
all sound trucks emitting loud and raucous noises. Justice Reed, while
recognizing the right of a speaker to have willing listeners, attempted
to effectuate an adjustment of the conflicting interests of free speech
and of freedom not to listen, on the basis that the pedestrian or homeowner can readily reject a pamphlet or move out of earshot of an
offensive conversation but is helpless against the bombardment of
loud-speakers. Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, separately concurring, reaffirmed their Saia v. New York dissents.1 3 Justice Frankfurter's view was that regulation of amplification of speech is not
regulation of speech itself, and that listeners should be free to put
their feedom of mind to uses of their own choice without the imposition of greatly magnified noise. In the instant case Judge Edgerton,
of the circuit court of appeals, interpreted the Kovacs opinion as

DSee 39 HARv. L. REv. 431, 440 (1926).
IoWarren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890);
cf. the dissent of Brandeis, J., in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471
(1928), especially his reference at 478 to the constitutional right of the citizen,
as against those governing, ". . . to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men."
llAllgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897). Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), is to the same effect, but both struck down state interference with business and did not even approach the problem presented in the

instant case.
12336 U.S. 77 (1949); see Note, 2 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 103 (1949).
13334 U.S. 558, 566, 562 (1948); see Note, 2 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 103 (1949).
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elevating freedom of attention from forced listening to a position out14
ranking any right to amplify speech.
Appraisal of the instant decision requires observance of the separate opinions filed and strict limitation to the facts found by the
commission. The majority justices see no error in the finding of reasonable service to the public despite the broadcasts, and likewise
detect no free speech issue, inasmuch as the evidence of record clearly
demonstrated unhampered ordinary conversation among the passengers. Furthermore they reject flatly the contention that each passenger on a governmentally regulated vehicle possesses "a right of
privacy substantially equal to the privacy to which he is entitled in
his own home."'15 Nevertheless the freedom to broadcast is not a
blank check; the Court specifically calls attention to the absence of
any issue concerning "objectionable propaganda."' 16 Justice Black, in
a concurring opinion doubly significant in view of its about-face from
his earlier position in the Saia17 and Kovacs8 decisions, enters the
caveat that ". . . subjecting Capital Transit's passengers to the broadcasting of news, public speeches, views, or propaganda of any kind
and by any means would violate the First Amendment."'The more extreme view is indicated in the dissent of Justice
Douglas; 20 still clinging to his basic philosophy that any practice
susceptible to abuse in the future is bad even though properly exercised at present, he maintains that in forcing the attention of the
unwilling listener merely because of the wishes of a majority of his
fellow passengers the Court is too narrowly restricting the concept of
liberty embodied in the Fifth Amendment. Propaganda of a slight
but insidious sort may well be the next step. Justice Douglas would
draw the line now on behalf of the minority passenger: "My protest
is against the invasion of his privacy over and beyond the risks of
travel." 21 Yet in Kovacs and Saia he and Justice Black joined in
favoring unrestricted noise, forced upon unwilling listeners.
The instant decision does not overrule Saia v. New York. The onevote distinction between flat municipal prohibition plus public
14Pollak v. Public Util. Comm'n, 191 F.2d 450, 456-457 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
"sAt p. 464.
1GAt p. 463.
17Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
'SKovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 98 (1949).
"'At p. 466.
2"At p. 467.
2"At p. 468.
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